America's Defensive Riddle: From 2 Goals in 6 Matches to 18 in 9

I sat in the lower stand of Estadio Azteca on the afternoon of 3 October, waiting for the first half to end. The scoreboard read 1-0, but my eyes were not on the score — they were fixed on America's back four. Sebastian Caceres was not there; his contract had already expired, and the defenders brought in to replace him had not yet found their cohesion. In their previous six matches, this team had conceded just two goals. In the nine matches since, they have conceded 18. That number is not just a statistic; it is the story of a change that was visible on the pitch but never captured in the scoresheet.

To understand America's defensive journey this season, we must first look at those opening six matches. Against Queretaro, Santos, San Luis and Puebla, America kept clean sheets. But the quality of these opponents' attacks demands scrutiny. None of these teams rank among the league's top attacking units. It was a defensive rhythm built on the weakness of opponents, not on America's defensive mastery.

What followed is a case study for any football analyst. Eighteen goals in nine matches — an average of two per game. That is a level unacceptable for any top team. But one thing must not be overlooked: four of those 18 came in a single match against Cruz Azul. Those four goals account for 22 percent of the total. Remove that one match, and the remaining eight games average 1.75 goals per game — much closer to the league's normal level.

I have watched many Liga MX matches over the past few years, and I remember that when I first saw America live in 2026, their defense had the same instability. But this season's number is different because it is not just instability — it is a clear decline. The question is whether this decline is a structural problem or just a bad patch.

The Four Causes of Defensive Collapse — and Their Real Weight

America's defensive decline is woven from four distinct threads, but these threads must be weighed separately. The first thread is the departure of Sebastian Caceres. After his contract expired, the team has visibly lacked an experienced centre-back. But does one player's departure cause an entire defense to collapse? This question matters because even with Caceres, the team had put in weak performances in some matches. His departure may be a cause, but not the only one.

The second thread is the late arrival of new centre-backs. Defenders who arrived in the final days of the transfer window had no time to build cohesion with the team. This is a problem every team faces, but for a team like America, it proves more costly because they are expected to win every match.

The third thread is full-back instability. Throughout the season, America has changed its back line repeatedly. In nine matches, the same back line started only three times, while changes were made six times. This constant shuffling is fatal for any defensive unit. In football, defense is a collective effort, and collectivity requires continuity.

The fourth thread is rotation. The coach's rotation decision is understandable — the season is long, there are multiple competitions, and players need to stay fresh. But the direct relationship between rotation and defensive stability cannot be ignored.

The Data That Changes the Story

After hearing all four causes, a question arises — does any of them actually explain that number? To answer this, we need more data that was absent from the original analysis.

First, the pattern of goals conceded. Are these 18 goals spread evenly across the nine matches, or concentrated in one period? If 12 goals came in the last three matches, that is a different story — a story of decline. If they are scattered across all nine, it is a story of instability. The two have different remedies.

Second, the type of goals. Conceding from set pieces is a different problem from conceding from open play. If America has conceded mostly from set pieces, the problem is marking and height. If from open play or transitions, the problem is positional discipline and recovery speed. The original analysis makes no mention of this, which is a major gap.

Third, the goalkeeper's performance. A nine-match defensive analysis with no mention of the goalkeeper is structurally incomplete. If the keeper has underperformed relative to expectation, blaming the back four entirely would be wrong.

Fourth, the strength of opponents. The early clean sheets came against weak attacks. The later nine matches featured stronger opponents. This is a factor that must be controlled for.

The Cruz Azul Match — Exception or Signal?

The match against Cruz Azul, in which America conceded four goals, is the center of this entire debate. If we remove that match, the remaining eight average 1.75 — close to the league's normal level. But the question is whether removing that match is justified.

In my experience, dismissing a heavy defeat as an "outlier" is easy, but not necessarily correct. If Cruz Azul exposed a weakness in America's defense that other teams were not capable of exploiting, then that match is a warning, not an exception. And in the Liguilla, every opponent will be as capable as Cruz Azul.

The Biggest Gap Nobody Noticed

There is one aspect of this entire analysis that no one has addressed — the relationship between back-line continuity and goals conceded. The original analysis notes that the same back line started only three times in nine matches, but never correlates this with goals conceded.

This is an analysis that could have been done with existing data. If the three matches with a stable back line saw fewer goals conceded, it would prove that continuity matters. If goals were conceded there too, the problem lies elsewhere. It is just a cross-tab, but it could change the direction of the entire debate.

In my experience, analysis of teams' defensive problems often focuses on individual players — who arrived, who left. But the truth is that in modern football, defense is a system. It is the combination of the back four, the goalkeeper, the midfield's defensive role, and the team's overall pressing structure. Weaving an entire defensive story around the arrival and departure of centre-backs is a narrow view.

Toward the Liguilla — Is This Really the Biggest Problem?

Now the most important question — is defense really America's biggest problem? To answer this, we need a comparison. Squad depth, reliance on attack, coach Almada's in-game management — where does defense stand against these?

The fact is that despite conceding so many goals, America is still in the upper table. This suggests their attack is strong enough to mask the defensive weakness. But in the Liguilla, this equation will not hold. In knockout football, one goal carries enormous weight, and playing at a rate of two goals conceded per game is tantamount to self-destruction.

But there is a catch. Knockout football is the most uncertain format. A sample of two to six matches cannot prove or disprove any defensive thesis. If America performs well in the Liguilla, it will be said the defense improved. If they perform poorly, it will be said the defense was the weak link. In either case, the analysis will be proven right — and that is the biggest weakness of this analysis.

The Way Forward

The data America has at this point in the season sends a clear signal — but the signal is not as clear as it appears. Conceding two goals in six matches is as extreme as conceding 18 in nine. Both are extremes. The truth probably lies somewhere in between — 20 goals in 15 matches this season, or 1.33 per game, which is a normal rate for a typical top-half team.

The real question is not "is the defense bad." The real question is "which of these two numbers is closer to the team's true level." Answering that requires xGA (expected goals against), shots faced, and opponent-adjusted data. The early clean sheets came against weak attacks, so the true level is probably worse than the first number and better than the second.

What I learned sitting among 131,781 spectators at Salt Lake Stadium in Kolkata in 2026 was that numbers do not lie, but they do not tell the whole story either. America's defensive number is a warning, but it would be premature to conclude it is the team's biggest problem. Before the Liguilla begins, coach Almada has a few weeks — to see if he can stabilize the back line, and whether that stability changes the goals-conceded number.

Those who say defense is everything forget that football is a game of 11 players — and defense is not just four of them. America's real test will come in the Liguilla, where every goal is worth more than a season's work. Until then, this number will remain an open question — one that will be answered only on the pitch, not in the spreadsheet.